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ABSTRACT.  Although central to many debates in neo-institutional theories, the concept 
of agency still remains fairly ambiguous and sometimes elusive. In particular, the agency 
concept tends to conflate two different phenomena, the power of agency (the capacity to 
act in a given social context) and agentic power (the capacity to act independently of 
structural  constraints). The  paper  explores the  interplay  between these two types of 
agency in the slow abandonment of asbestos in France from 1970 to 1997. Based on 
archival data and interviews, we graphically reconstitute a deinstitutionalization process 
composed of a series of actions. As an important contribution, the paper puts to light a 
pattern  where  different  types  of  agencies  are  combined  in  a  momentum.  Peripheral 
actors bring agentic power to another actor in the field who then induce different kinds 
of  efforts  supported  by  power  of  agency.  Thus,  agency  is  circulating  and  being 
transformed from an actor to another. The slow abandonment of asbestos is explained 
by the dispersion of agentic power:  actors tend to be incorporated in the consensus they 
have contributed to bring out, weakening their agentic power.  
 
 
While some scholars have explored the deinstitutionalisation phenomenon (Greenwood et al. 
2002 ; Hiatt et al. 2009 ; Maguire and Hardy 2009 ; Oliver 1992), more seldom have been the 
studies that reconstitute and explore the succession of actions in the process, explaining how 
these actions interact and account for the process of institutional disruption. To “delegitimate 
an established organizational practice or procedure” (Oliver 1992 p564), to disrupt taken-for-
granted assumptions, and to annihilate logics of maintenance, deinstitutionalisation requires 
specific work  (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006 ;  Maguire and Hardy 2009). To do that, the 
meticulous analysis of a series of actions is particularly relevant, all the more than it has been 
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At the heart of this debate about actions to change institutions, agency is a central concept. 
However,  this  word  subsumes  a  series  of  complex  issues  in  the  sociological  and 
organizational literature, leading sometimes to confusion. Drawing on Campbell‟s call (2009) 
for distinguishing power of agency and agentic power, this paper aims at exploring how these 
two phenomena are related and contribute together to social change. Our interest revolves 
around the role of different types of actions, rather than a focus on disruptive events in the 
longitudinal process of deinstitutionalisation. We have reconstituted through secondary data 
and primary data the story of asbestos in France. Then, from this story, we build a graphical 
process representation, underlining the succession of institutional actions and their interaction. 
An  effort  does  not  necessarily  produce  immediate  effects  on  institutions,  but  can  be 
associated, combined, translated, adapted by other actors and then produce significant effects 
at a macro level. In this process we explore the interplay of agencies and we assess whether 
some patterns can be identified. 
 
Some actions and events have the power to radically contribute to institutional disruption. 
Several scholars have emphasized deinstitutionalization cases, which illustrate the capacity of 
actors to alter and destroy existing institutions (Hiatt et al. 2009 ; Maguire and Hardy 2009 ; 
Oliver  1992).  While  many  studies  about  institutional  change  have  relied  on  longitudinal 
analysis over several decades (amongst others Chung and Luo 2008 ; D'Aunno et al. 2000 ; 
Greenwood et al. 2002 ; Hoffman 1999 ; Leblebici et al. 1991a ; Tolbert and Zucker 1996 ; 
Tolbert and Zucker 1983), studies about institutional disruption or deinstitutionalisation have 
emphasized the role of jolts (Meyer et al. 1990) that destabilize established practices. Jolts 
catalyze the evolution of the field and precipitate its change. As  instance, Maguire‟s and 
Hardy‟s research (2009) underlines the publication of Silent Spring as a jolt that initiated the 
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While jolts play a very important role in institutional disruption, it is also important to take 
into account longer periods and the succession of actions leading to institutional disruption. 
Institutional change cannot be attributed to a single event. Instead, change is the effect of a 
social construction of events that are collectively assimilated, sorted out and theorized.  
 
Our goal is to develop what elements, in a particular course of actions, can account for the 
slow decline of asbestos in France, after decades of dialectical efforts.  
 
 
Agency, agentic power and power of agency 
The major thrust of contemporary institutional research has been a deeper investigation of 
agency. The “structure versus agency debate”  (Hirsch and Lounsbury 1997) has probably 
constituted a central concern for institutionalists” (Heugens and Lander 2009). To go beyond 
oppositions between a pure entrepreneur and an entirely constrained individual, some scholars 
have invited to a deeper grasp of the agency concept (Battilana and D'Aunno 2009 ; Lawrence 
and Suddaby 2006 ; Lawrence et al. 2009). While these attempts for a better conceptualisation 
of agency are promising, it still remains “slippery” (Campbell 2009 ; Hitlin and Elder 2007 
p170).  Being  closely  associated  with  the  agency-structure  debates,  it  inherits  some 
inextricable  sociological  and  philosophical  issues,  such  as  the  autonomy  of  actors,  the 
definition of interests and intentions, the awareness of reality and finally the question of free 
will. While some scholars belong to the Locke‟s tradition in which agency is the foundation 
of rational choice, individualist action and progress in general, other scholars, closer to Kant‟s 
view,  perceive  agency  as  an  intermediary  between  free  will  and  normative  constraint 
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Not  surprisingly,  many  scholars  have  tried  to  decipher  the  “vagueness”  (Emirbayer  and 
Mische 1998 p962) of the agency concept, especially in the sociological literature (Campbell 
2009 ; Emirbayer and Mische 1998 ; Fuchs 2001 ; Hitlin and Elder 2007 ; Sewell 1992). 
These reflections  have  not  contributed  yet  to  a stabilisation of “agency”  and some of its 
foundations still appear fuzzy. For example, Alexander (1992) criticizes sociologists for their 
tendency to conflate actors with agency. Some other times, agency is simply employed as a 
synonym for action. This lack of consensus about agency raises the question of its utility to 
describe social issues (Loyal and Barnes 2001).  
Following a brief overview of the term “agency”  in  the sociological  literature, Campbell 
(2009) observes two distinct approaches. On the one hand, agency is perceived as “the power 
that individuals possess that enables them to realize their chosen goals” (2009 p408). On the 
other hand, “agency” is essentially opposed to structure and it is described as the capacity of 
individuals to act independently of social constraints. However, it is not obvious to equate the 
realization of chosen goals and the capacity to act independently of social structures. It is on 
the contrary two different phenomena. The former refers to the question of individual power, 
interests and intentions while the latter relies to the resistance to structural power. This basic 
distinction must be taken seriously to account for the transformative capacity of actors and it 
leads  Campbell  to  distinguish  “power  of  agency” (type 1) and  “agentic power”  (type 2). 
Power of agency is required to achieve goals. It is necessary to engage into actions, whether 
they  are  repetitive,  traditional,  adaptative  or  creative.  Power  of  agency  impacts  on  the 
environment of actors and requires autonomy, will and sometimes creativity. However, these 
qualities apply “to the means through which action is accomplished” (Campbell 2009 p410). 
As for agentic power, it is also based on voluntarism, autonomy and creativity but these 
qualities are applied not only on the means of action but on actions and goals themselves. 












































Collective action process and institutional work 
The  combination  of  these  two  types  of  agency  is  not  necessarily  a  solitary  exercise.  To 
account for change, an increasing number of scholars have investigated the role of collective 
action,  and  especially  the  combination  of  efforts  exerted  by  individuals  or  groups  with 
different interests, capabilities and values. To annihilate logics of maintenance and to unveil 
taken-for-granted assumptions, deinstitutionalization requires considerable efforts.  
Social movement theories have greatly contributed to the understanding of collective efforts 
aimed at change, especially through political behaviours and dialectical actions (Hargrave and 
Van  de  Ven  2006).  Drawing  on  Rucht‟s  definition  of  a  social  movement, 
deinstitutionalisation  can  be  perceived  as  the  result  of  “an  action  system  comprised  of 
mobilized networks of individuals, groups, or organizations” (1999) that attempts to disrupt 
institutionalized elements by means of collective protest. Several scholars have investigated 
the  impact  of  social  movements  on  institutions,  as  well  on  the  regulative,  normative  or 
cognitive pillars (e.g. Hiatt et al. 2009 ; Johnson 2008 ; King 2008 ; Morill et al. 2003 ; Rao et 
al. 2003 ; Snow et al. 1986 ; Soule and King 2006).  
However, the outcomes of social movements  and collective action are difficult to predict 
(Hiatt et al. 2009) and only few studies explore their impact on organizations and industries 
(Schneiberg et al. 2008 ; Sine and Lee 2009). Since they consist on political behaviours and 
struggles, aiming at promoting or denigrating specific structures and practices, they imply a 
complex  network  of  actions,  intentions  and  interests.  Finally,  they  alter  organisational 
landscapes in different ways, leading sometimes to unexpected consequences. The study of 
Hiatt et al. (2009) emphasizes both intended and unintended effects of social movements in 
the  case  of  alcohol  consumption  in  America.  Their  study  underlines  for  example  the 












































A focus on collective action to apprehend institutional work offers an interesting perspective.  
There is a complex intertwine between purposive efforts, institutional effects, and collective 
movements so generated. Most of institutional studies are focused on processes that connect 
actions with institutional effects but overlook most of concrete practices employed by actors, 
as  the  product  of  interactions.  Meanwhile,  these  actions  rely  on  different  levels  of 
mobilisation. As a matter of fact, institutional work may disrupt an institution, but may also 
fail to do so. Studies of institutional work should take into account all kinds of activities 
aimed  at  changing,  disrupting  or  maintaining  institutions,  independently  of  their  actual 
effects. As Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca (2009 p11) put it “the study of institutional work 
offers an invitation to move beyond a linear view of institutional processes [...]. Because it 
points to the study of activities rather than accomplishment, success as well as failure, acts of 
resistance and of transformation, the concept of institutional work may contribute to a move 
away from a concentrated, heroic, and successful conception of institutional agency”. 
 
Institutional change and agency 
As we emphasized earlier, agency is a key concept to explain institutional change. Its role is 
yet controversial. Lamberg and al. (2010) distinguish two sets of assumptions which originate 
change in different sources. From a structuralist perspective, actors are embedded in dense 
social  networks,  and  thus,  they  mainly  enact  routines  and  habits.  In  that  case,  change  is 
explained  by  exogenous  jolts  which  may  divert  actors  from  their  routines.  From  an 
individualistic  point  of  view,  the  question  of  interests  is  more  central,  and  change  is  a 
consequence of purposive actions.  Individuals  design and implement institutional changes 
(Fligstein 1997). The description of agency as an interplay between power of agency and 
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structuralism and methodological individualism. Some individuals, at a particular time, are 
endowed with agentic power, for example due to contradictory logics (Leblebici et al. 1991b ; 
Seo and Creed 2002), and some others with power of agency. To that extent, there may be a 
dynamic oscillation between power of agency and agentic power, between individuals and 
through time. The understanding of the dual and complementary types of agency may lead to 
a better understanding of the institutional dynamic, especially considering the interplay of 
efforts in the collective process of change. While agency is a key concept that has mainly 
been used to account for the capacity of entrepreneurs to change institutions, the way agency 
circulates between different actors in the case of collective change has been overlooked. As 
table 1 illustrates, we may organize different studies about institutional change taking into 
account  the  type  and  the  source  of  agency.  From  existing  studies,  we  can  note  that 
institutional change is often due to power of agency, enabled as well at a field level and at an 
organizational  and  individual  level.  Yet,  most  of  these  studies  overlook  to  which  extent 
agency circulates within a field, combining agentic power and power of agency to generate 
change.  This leads us to important questions: 
How type 1 and type 2 of agency are linked in the process of change? Is there a temporal 


















































METHODS AND DATA 
To study the interplay of power aof agency and agentic power, we focus on a single case. It 
illustrates  an  exemplary  deinstitutionalisation  process  over  several  decades.  From  a  “magical 
mineral” to the “the public enemy number one”, asbestos has been progressively considered as a 
lethal substance and has been forbidden in 1997 in France. Several reasons have motivated the 
choice of studying this long process of institutionalization change. First, the controversy in 
France has brought major social struggles and has generated a large coalition of opponents and 
defenders  of  asbestos.  Second,  this  case  is  remarkable  considering  the  very  long  period  for 
asbestos to be deinstitutionalized: asbestos hasbeen forbidden in France only for 1997, instead of 
-Contradictory  institutional  arrangements 
may  trigger  actors‟  reflexivity  (Battilana 
and D'Aunno 2009 ; Emirbayer and Mische 
1998 ; Seo and Creed 2002) 
 
- Jolts may contribute to the emergence of 
new  ideas  and  capacity  to  resist  against 
existing  structures  (Fligstein  2001  ; 
Greenwood et al. 2002) 
 
-  Existence  of  complex  and  multifaceted 
problems may foster questioning, creativity 
and reflexivity (Phillips et al. 2000) 
-Incomplete  institutionalization  and 
heterogeneity  of  practices  fosters  change 
through day to day  actions  (Clemens and 
Cook 1999 ; D'Aunno et al. 2000 ; Tolbert 
and Zucker 1996) 
 
-Combination  between  heterogeneous 
institutional arrangements and high level of 
institutionalization  facilitates  change 
(Dorado 2005) 
 
-Organizations and actors at the periphery 
of  a  field  are  more  likely  to  break  with 
existing institutions (Leblebici et al. 1991b) 
and  struggles  against  existing  structural 
constraints 
-Organizations and actors at the margin of 
different fields are more likely to produce 
change through their daily practices (Levy 
and Egan 2003 ; Rao et al. 2000) 
-Individuals  with  long  term  interests  are 
more  related  to  institutional  changes 
(Lamberg and Pajunen 2010) 
Type of agency 
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the  80‟s  for  most  other  industrialized  countries.  The  French  case  raises  the  question  of  the 
interplay of diverging institutional efforts and requires a deep analysis to understand how actors 
collectively interact and contribute to institutional change. 
 
Asbestos is a natural mineral that has been considered as a “magic” substance. It has been a 
key material, especially to answer the needs of the demographic revolution in France and to 
repair the damages caused by the Second World War. In the 70s, asbestos was used in the 
production  of  about  3000  products  in  France  and  was  the  main  lag  employed  in  the 
construction  industry.  It  remained  massively  used  in  the  70‟  until  the  scandal  of  Amisol 
workers  and  the  mobilization  of  the  “Collectif  de  Jussieu”.  The  “Collectif  de  Jussieu” 
communicated in mass media and succeeded in connecting different movements. In particular, 
it  enrolled  some  Amisol  workers,  which  constituted  a  a  tipping  point  in  the  debate.  It 
provoked  strong  reactions  from  the  asbestos  industry  which  produced  their  own  texts 
challenging the opponents‟ claims about the noxiousness of asbestos. This crisis period had 
led to the controlled use of asbestos in France from 1977and resulted to a general consensus: a 
new committee called CPA (Asbestos Permanent Committee) was created. This committee, 
constituted  by  industrials,  researchers  and  workers‟  representatives,  had  to  take  decision 
concerning asbestos in France. This raises an interesting issue: how such a consensus has been 
decided in spite of divergent interests? The all-interesting point is that actors engaged in the 
disruptive work, at that time, did not want to ban asbestos. Calls for abandoning asbestos 
appeared  very  lately.  This  aspect  is  due  to  the  co-existence  of  conflicting  interests  and 
sociological  evolution  such  as  unemployment,  fear  of  outsourcing  or  demands  for  better 
working conditions. We can note a shift in the central concerns of the debate between 1970 
and 1997. During the 70s, debates more particularly revolved around unemployment. The 
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contextual fear of unemployment and the fact that professional risks were not topical issues 
explain the consensus around the controlled use of asbestos, rather than its ban. During the 
80s, questioning whether asbestos should be used was not frequent. In the 90s, there was a 
change in the perceptions of work and especially the issue of the working environment took 
more importance. Claims for the ban of asbestos appeared only in the 90s after the first cases 
of decease and death caused by asbestos and due to the publication of an alarming scientific 
report by the INSERM. Finally, asbestos was banned in France in 1997. 
 
Research design  
To understand how different types of agency interact in the process of institutional disruption, 
we explore the story of asbestos in France and especially the institutional actions  between 
1970 to 1997. The case is well-documented, which allows us to constitute a rich material of 
secondary data. This material is analyzed in different ways to indentify and explain the efforts 
implied  in  deinstitutionalization.  We  began  by  collecting  data  in  the  form  of  secondary 
accounts (Lear, 1997) to ensure convergence and triangulation on events. We relied mainly on 
archival data (the press coverage of the scandal of asbestos in France, public reports, tracts, 
books,  public  reports…).  Then  we  interview  key  actors  of  the  field.  Secondary  data  and 
interviews  are  the  basic  material  to  reconstitute  the  story  of  asbestos.  We  then  turn  this 
qualitative  story  in  a  database  of  institutional  actions  that  took  place  from  1970  to  1997.We 
identify from the story of asbestos 55 institutional actions and we represent these actions and their 
relationship on a timeline. One difficulty of this approach is to identify the proper qualitative 
datum, that is the action or incident that may participate to the process of institutional change. In 
our case, the basic unit we rely on is an action, whether it is achieved by an individual or an 
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existing institution, whether it is intentional or not. To that extent, we have excluded from our 
chronology  repetitive  actions  and  routines  that  only  consist  in  the  reproduction  of 
institutionalized practices. This selection of actions was discussed and validated with experts: 
Pr Brochard, epidemiologist who belonged to the CPA; M. Thébaud-Mony, scientist, member 
of the INSERM and Ban-Asbestos; M. Ledoux, lawyer for the asbestos victims in 1994; M. 
Parigot,  professor  at  Jussieu  and  founder  of  the  main  association  that  protects  asbestos 
victims. Our aim was to understand the cause and consequence for each action. The experts 
validated with us the links between different actions but also their context.  
 
In addition to that, we study institutional change at a macro level. To do that, we rely on 
archival data analysis. We have constituted a corpus of representative texts from press, House 
of Parliament, books, press release to identify the main issues around asbestos at different 
times.  Through  these  texts,  we  tend  to  identify  the  main  evolution  of  the  perceptions 
concerning asbestos.   
 
  1970-1977  1978-1992  1992-1997 
Authors of 
the texts from 
the corpus 
-  Asbestos  Union 
(press release) 
-  Media  (press, 
radio, TV) 
-  Workers‟  Union 
(tract) 
-  CIRC  (Public 
Institution) 
-  INSERM  (public 
Institution, report) 
-  Asbestos  Union 
(white  Paper,  press 
release) 
-  Government 
(Decree)  
- Workers‟ Union 






- Collectif de Jussieu 





Table 2: Sources of texts 
 
These texts represent for four different periods, from 1970 to 1997, the evolution of beliefs, 
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most notable evolution in the perceptions around asbestos. This analysis has been assisted by 
Prospéro  (Chateauraynaud  2003),  a  piece  of  software  particularly  well  adapted  for  the 
longitudinal  textual  analysis.  This  method  enables  us  to  associate  actions  with  their 
institutional  context.  We  then  explore  the  potential  relationships  between  actions  and 
institutional evolution of asbestos. To build the timeline, we position the 55 actions according 
to the type of agency they mainly reflect. Finally this timeline has been debated with two 
scientists and one expert and in case of divergence was discussed to reach an agreement.  
The following lines detail the story of asbestos in France between 1970 to 1997. We then build a 
visual representation of the series of actions implied in the deinstitutionalization of asbestos, as 
they appear from the following story.  
 
THE SLOW DEATH OF ASBESTOS IN FRANCE 
1970-1977: the first scandal of asbestos in France 
The  period  between  1945  and  1970  can  be  seen  as  a  „golden  age‟  for  the  international 
asbestos industry. Some scientist and doctors published yet studies that demonstrated the link 
between asbestos and disease. First victims of asbestos appeared at the end of the 60s. Many 
former employees of the Johns-Manville company, one of the main producers of asbestos in 
the USA, were involved in a class action suit against the company for asbestos occupational 
disease. Studies were confidential and American problems stayed local. However, industrials 
forecasted difficulties in the coming years.  In 1971, industrials organized an international 
conference about asbestos in London. All European and Anglo-Saxon producers were there. 
The debate focused on risks linked to asbestos. Actually, the real aim of the meeting was to 
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defensive work. Then, in the European and American markets, a handful of experts lobbied 
for the sake of asbestos companies. This meeting led to the creation of the COFREBA in 
France. The COFREBA is the first lobbying organization created in France. Accordingly, the 
promise of the asbestos lobby – that asbestos can save lives and is economically necessary – 
appears increasingly attractive. However, public institutes, such as the WHO (World Health 
Organization)  or  the  INRS  (a  French  institute  in  charge  of  health  protection),  organized 
conferences and published guidelines about asbestos. This activity illustrates that asbestos 
risks were recognized, not to say well known but one of the enduring challenges was to learn 
how to use it safely. At the end of 1972, the ILO (International Labour Organization) and the 
IARC  (International  Agency  for  Research  on  Cancer)  reaffirmed  that  there  are  some 
controllable risks linked to the use of asbestos. These papers or research convey mainstream 
ideas as they are shaped by industrials . The most basic beliefs were that  asbestos is useful, 
strategic for rebuilding and for the army, and natural. The latter element was put forward to 
justify why asbestos can bring out some risks. For practical purposes, problems or conflicts 
about asbestos in France were limited to local events in factories where workers campaigned 
for better employees working environment. Asbestos is not a special problem; it is a dust like 
others.  Workers  wanted  to  have  a  better  working  environment.  However,  there  were  not 
aware of the exposure risks.  
The main disruptive event during this period occurred a few years after the beginning of an 
industrial strike in France. In 1974, a strike began at Amisol, a French asbestos producer and 
transformer. It was not caused by the fear of asbestos but because of the closing down of the 
company. Workers, most of them were women, were in strike to avoid unemployment. At the 
same time, some professors from a famous University in France, Jussieu, pointed out the 
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spheres,  the  action  group,  led  by  a  charismatic  professor  Henri  Pézerat,  investigated  the 
different dimensions of asbestos. First, they understood that it was dangerous for health. Then, 
they realized the power of asbestos industrials in the organization of the field in France. To 
sum  up,  they  bumped  into  the  silence:  industrials  have  the  total  control  over  debates. 
Professors from Jussieu decided to create a social event to alert media. They have heart about 
a small factory in the center of France called… Amisol. Henri Pézerat and his colleagues 
decided to go there to visit the company and inform employees about risks. The misery of 
these women and the death of about 10 of their colleagues since the beginning of the strike, 
created  a  media-event.  It  is  the  first  time  the  use  and  consequences  of  asbestos  were 
questioned. This industrial controversy revolved around such questions as: What are the real 
dangers of asbestos? Are workers and population in great danger? How to avoid new deaths 
caused  by  asbestos?  Is  asbestos  a  controllable  material?  The  media  fuelled  the  industrial 
debate  that  became  a  social  one.  The  French  consumer  association  “60  millions  of 
consumers” and journalists investigated and understood that asbestos is everywhere without 
any care. In the middle of the 70s, 3 000 products were made with asbestos in France along 
hundreds of buildings flocked with asbestos. One of the main French TV channels decided to 
broadcast three TV programs against asbestos that amplified the political debate. Industrials 
had no option but  to  develop  their defensive  work through conferences,  publications  and 
meetings with politicians. This discussion was reinterpreted in the tradition of risk assurance 
through the question of level of exposure. During the year 1976, there was an increase in the 
number of publications from both scientists and industrials. Scientists, who led the movement 
from  Jussieu,  accused  industrials  of  diminishing  the  importance  and  impact  of  asbestos, 
instead of analyzing the problems and the issues related to the use of asbestos (consequences 
for  workers  and  environmental  victims).    Scientists  call  for  scientific  projects  that  could 
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a national debate, that the main issue for politicians is to take decisions that bind by law the 
use of asbestos in France.  Governments put forward economic arguments focused on the 
profitability of asbestos, thus implicitly supporting the requests of industrials. Accordingly, 
asbestos was not banned and was considered as a controllable material. Thus, five laws were 
voted. Their aim was to protect workers without jeopardizing the industry. Between 1977 and 
1982,  industrials  organized  a  post  crisis  defensive  work  to  limit  the  impact  of  political 
decisions. Opponents entrusted the government with the problem of asbestos.  
1977-1992: the organized silence 
Definition of the nature of the risk triggered a debate in the political arena. The defensive 
work led by the industrials led to the creation of an original committee the “CPA” (in French 
“Comité  Permanent  Amiante”).  This  committee  was  responsible  for  all  the  questions 
connected  with  asbestos.  It  gathered  industrials,  researchers  and  workers‟  representatives. 
Funds came from industrials through a consulting company. The CPA was the central entity 
in the field. As a normative organization that gives stability to the field. It bridges economic 
interests with protection of workers. In fact, the main issue for industrials was to implement 
the controlled use of asbestos in France through the CPA. During this period, the CPA also 
produces some shared beliefs, legitimating the asbestos as long as there is a central entity that 
can control, prescribe and ensure stability. Concerning the actions during this period, it is 
extremely interesting to observe that none of them intend to disrupt the use of asbestos. From 
the past subversive actions, the only persisting dimension is the use of scientific studies to 
define the proper employ of asbestos. This normative constraint finally became a reason to 
pursue the use of asbestos which is guided by scientific recommendations. To that extent, the 
asbestos defenders exploited these existing norms to create a regulative organism called the 
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guided  by  scientists  and  industrials.  To  that  extent,,  there  is  a  long  period  (5  years)  of 
inaction. The struggles in the field were concentrated in a closed organization. In that way, 
divergences remained in a private sphere and were not covered by the media. Some European 
directives were voted in France, but without disrupting the field.  
1992-1997: the new scandal of asbestos in France 
While the government and the CPA generally argued that the use of asbestos was controlled, 
some political parties took a more critical view. However, their voice was not loud until the 
complaints  of  widows  in  1992.  Their  husbands  were  teachers  in  a  school  flocked  with 
asbestos.  These  men  were  not  workers  from  the  asbestos  industry.  One  of  the  main 
differences between the first and the second crisis is the appearance of “real visible victims” 
of asbestos. Given the nature of the event, it is unsurprising that the controversy initially 
revolved  aournd  social  and  health  principles.  In  the  same  time,  Julian  Peto,  an  English 
scientist  published  the  results  from  his  epidemiological  study:  hundreds  of  deaths  are 
forecasted for the next years in Great-Britain, where restrictions and protections are higher. 
This finding is a huge argument for Henri Pézerat to emerge from his silence. A conference is 
organized in Jussieu to present Julian Peto‟s research. H. Pézerat created a group of scientists 
and lawyers to implement a legal strategy to obtain the ban of asbestos. The re-emergence of 
questioning has generated a renewed interest, and led to the reopening of investigations. The 
CPA did no longer appear credible and was self dislocated. In this context, the ANDEVA 
(association  for  the  protection  of  asbestos  victims)  was  created,  which  had  a  strong 
institutional impact: asbestos became a national problem, and the juridical responsibility of 
the government and asbestos industrials was questioned. These criticisms turned asbestos into 
the national enemy number one, and led to a series of actions which eventually put an end to 
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debates on Amisol. The media fuelled and amplified the political debate: the asbestos crisis 
became a public health crisis. The  French government took a more cautious position and 
claimed that investigations should be conducted before conclusions could be drawn. With this 
point of view, the INSERM published a study that announced hundreds of deaths for the next 
20 years. In view of this situation, the French government has no choice but ban asbestos in 
France and implements a system of compensation for the victims.  
 
INSERT Figure 1 and figure 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
DISCUSSION   
The goal of this historical study was to address the role and importance of different types of 
agency and the dynamic between actions in the case of institutional change. Essentially, we 
provide evidence of the existence of pattern between the different types of agency.  
 
We propose a timeline (figure 1) that synthesizes the interplay of agencies in a process of 
institutional  change.  Our  aim  is  to  analyze  the  different  sequences  that  emerge  from  the 
analysis.   
Sequence  1:  We  can  see  that  one  event  in  the  USA  (complaints  against  Jonhs-
Manville) led to a series of actions of defensive work. These actions reflect the use of agentic 
power to maintain an institution. Then, as a consequence, we can observe a series of actions 
that result from power of agency. Indeed, we can observe a kind of political work through the 
adoption of laws and the publications of reports from public institute. It the first time the 












































One interesting point concerning this sequence is the interdependence between the three types 
of action listed here. Indeed, alone, the event in the USA didn‟t have any impact on asbestos 
in France. However, this event has been captured by central actors in the field endowed with 
agentic  power.  In  their  strategy  of  maintenance,  this  event  had  a  special  impact  for  the 
industrials. It is the first time they imagined the end of the “golden age” of asbestos in France. 
They  decided  to  structure  the  field  around  the  guidelines  proposed  at  the  international 
conference.  For  example,  they  created  a  real  producer-union,  the  COFREBA.  This  new 
organization and structure allowed them to control the field and impede the actors endowed 
with power of agency (INRS, WHO for example).  
The  complete  sequence  had  an  institutional  impact:  research  studies  were  a  source  of 
legitimacy. It is induced by the questioning of the practice and the strategy of dominant actors 
to prove the complexity of asbestos.  
 
Sequence 2: The meeting with Jussieu and Amisol‟s workers can be interpreted as an 
action  at  the  periphery  of  the  field.  Some  actors  at  the  periphery  of  the  field,  such  as 
intellectuals or artists that support the strike in Amisol or residents that are afraid of being 
polluted, create the conditions for a disruptive work that relies on agentic power. These series 
of actions bring about reactions of actors that have power of agency (government, institutes). 
Then,  in  response  to  these  actions,  industrials  develop  their  defensive  work  with  agentic 
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power.  This  agentic  power  enables  them  to  limit  the  impact  of  the  power  of  agency  of 
government and the agentic power from the disruptive work.  
 
Sequence 3: Media, at the periphery of the field, fuelled and amplified the debate. 
They created a new arena for actors with agentic power. Thus, these actors develop from both 
side defensive or disruptive work. These debate led to the re-emergence in the debate of 
actors endowed with power of agency.  
 
 
Sequence  4:  At  the  end  of  the  70s,  the  field  seems  to  be  under  the  control  of 
industrials,  endowed  with  agentic  power.  They  implement  the  CPA  and  impose  the 
“controlled use of asbestos” in France. We observe the absence of disruptive work during the 
period. Industrials use their agentic power to control the field. Besides, the decisions taken by 
the government also depend on the power endowed by industrials. Actions are adaptations of 
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Comments about sequences 2 – 3 - 4 
The meeting between Jussieu and Amisol can be perceived as an action led by an actor 
at the periphery of the field because the workers weren‟t aware of the risks (they were on 
strike  to  obtain  the  reopening  of  the  factory)  and  the  professors  from  Jussieu  were  not 
specialists of asbestos. Amisol and Jussieu created an event: the proof (Amisol workers) and 
the  knowledge  (legitimacy  of  scientific  professors).  This  situation  gave  them  an  agentic 
power. They used it to question asbestos and “re-define” the field with negative aspects. This 
capacity  to  question  the  use  of  asbestos  offers  opportunity  for  scientists  (especially  form 
public institute) to study consequences of asbestos. The new arena created here challenged the 
dominant  actors  (represented  by  the  industrials)  and  Jussieu‟s  movement  captured  their 
agentic power. The interesting point is also that this movement spread power of agency to 
public institute and governments. The actions of these individuals contributed to foster the 
disruptive work during this period. As we can see on the timeline, at the end of sequence 2, 
industrials made their mark on the process with their agentic power. They used it to develop 
their defensive work. This dynamic between actors concerned by asbestos explains why its 
use has not been banned at the end at the first crisis. The action at the periphery offers the 
possibility  for  different  types  of  actors  to  have  an  agentic  power.  This  agentic  power 
introduces  new  issues  and  challenge  the  field.  In  some  cases,  it  forces  actors  such  as 
government and public institute to react with their power of agency. However, agentic power, 
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possessed by non-dominant actors, is not sufficient to disrupt the field. It does not allow them 
to  convince  and  enroll  dominant  actors,  endowed  with  the  effective  power  to  change 
institutions. For example, the government took timid decisions, and only tried to limit the 
threshold of exposure.. This type of decision confirmed industrials in their position and, more 
important, it annihilates the efforts of certain actors and the agentic power they have used.. 
The sequence 4 represents the period of the controlled use of asbestos in France. Industrials 
are  endowed  with  agentic  power  and  controlled  the  field.  This  period  explains  why  the 
deinstitutionalization process was so long in France comparing to other countries. The agentic 
power of industrials was used to set new rules in the field and impede  the capacity of other 
individuals to change institutionalized elements concerning asbestos. This power also shaped 
actions from actors endowed with power of agency like the French government that limits its 
action  to  the  adaptation  in  French  law  of  the  European  directives  (actions  that  are  the 
minimum to do).  
 
Sequence 5: We find the same pattern in the last sequence. Media (still local) and 
Julian Peto, at the periphery of the field, led actions that have created a new arena for actors 
that wanted to disrupt the practice. Professors at Jussieu have an agentic power that carry 
public institute (such as Inserm) away. A new media mobilization leads to real disruptive 
work. In this sequence, actors who want to defend asbestos don‟t have power anymore. It is a 
silent period for them as if the cause was only lost (due to international pressure and reality of 
the facts). The disruptive work leads to a series of actions from the government. These actions 













































         The sequence 5 is really interesting because it represents the process that led to the ban 
of asbestos in France. As we noted in the previous sequence (sequence 4: the CPA in France), 
industrials controlled the question of asbestos in France. Non-dominant actors didn‟t have any 
way  of  acting  anymore.  The  capacity  of  reemerging  in  the  debate  was  possible  with  the 
publication in Great-Britain of Julian Peto‟s study. This study is a key event in the process 
because it offers a new capacity of “being heart” for silent actors. Like in sequence 1, the 
danger of asbestos is proved. Henri Pézerat creates a kind of new committee at the University 
of Jussieu (we can talk about the re-birth of the mobilization). The aim of this action is now to 
obtain the ban of asbestos in France. They use their agentic power denounce the consensus of 
CPA and to elaborate a strategy to put an end to the use of asbestos. During this first part of 
the sequence, actors endowed with power of agency are influenced by industrials. The agentic 
power of non dominant actors forced them to act but their decisions are timid (they only order 
studies from the INSERM). They used their power of agency to constrain the effects of the 
agentic power of subversive actors. A second series of actions from the periphery of the field 
reinforced  the  agentic  power  of  the  challengers.  Actors  endowed  with  power  of  agency 
changed the aim of their actions. As industrials lost their legitimacy in the field due to new 
proofs about the noxiousness of asbestos, they also lose their power in the field. As we noted 
in previous sequences, the entire sequence is necessary to explain how challengers can be 
endowed with a sufficient agentic power to challenge the institution. Agentic power shaped 
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one category of actors has agentic power, they create a momentum where actions are led by 
individuals  or  organizations  with  power  of  agency.  These  actions  are  consistent  with  the 
interests of actors endowed with agentic power. 
 
Conclusion 
A question guided our inquiry: why is the deinstitutionalization process of asbestos in France 
so slow? By answering the above question, our study contributes to a greater understanding of 
the role that the interplay of agencies plays in the process of deinstitutionalization. That said, 
we do not offer a decisive argument to this question. We should analyze further the field, and 
explore  in  particular  the  causal  relationship  between  actions  and  institutional  change.  
However, our longitudinal approach reveals the interest of studying the circulation of agencies 
in  a  field.  Doing  so,  we  identify  a  pattern  of  actions  that  explains  one  dimension  of 
institutional dynamics.  
We put forward a view of deinstitutionalisation as a cumulative process, not a disruption 
essentially provoked by a jolt. This paper describes a long process and drawing on the concept 
of institutional work, we have identified a series of efforts which have impacted the use of 
asbestos. This study does not focus on actions which succeed in disrupting an institution, but 
on all kinds of efforts oriented toward the institution. As Lawrence and al. (2009) explained, 
not enough studies analyse different types of efforts even those which are unsuccessful. 
 
Also, one important contribution of this study is the representation of an institutional process 
over a long period, between 1970 and 1997. To analyse these actions and their relationships, 
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their relationships. Applied to the case of asbestos, we can observe clusters of actions. This 
particular  phenomenon  is  well  adapted  to  the  concept  of  momentum.  Jansen  (2004) 
distinguishes  statis-based momentum  and  change-based  momentum.  In  both  cases, actors‟ 
efforts are inscribed in a specific path and course of actions. The former represents an energy 
associated with persisting or with extending a current trajectory and the latter refers to an 
energy associated with a new trajectory. We can observe from our study that institutional 
actions are not necessarily constrained by a momentum for change or stability. However, we 
can notice that some groups of actions are perceived and rationalized as local momentums and 
participate  to  create  other  momentums.  For  example,  the  actions  4,  5,  7  and  9  can  be 
interpreted  as  a  momentum  which  institutionalizes  the  need  for  scientific  caution  to  use 
asbestos. This momentum of actions (achieved by fairly neutral actors) is reinterpreted by 
other actors. It is considered as an alert and then leads to a second momentum: the public 
denunciation of asbestos. A set of actors, motivated by divergent interests produce a series of 
actions  which  all  contribute  to  the  public  criticism  of  asbestos.  Similarly,  the  defensive 
actions 19, 21 and 24 are not a direct answer to a single actor. They seek to respond to a set of 
disrupting ideas produced by the previous momentum.  
 
Finally, our emphasis on two types of agency is a key contribution to set a bridge between 
two  approaches  to  explain  institutional  change:  the  structuralist  or  the  methodological 
individualism view. We point out the fact that some actors may have the power to go beyond 
structural constraints but without institutionalizing their view. That is why, power of agency 
and agentic power appear closely related to explain change. Besides, this study also invites to 
explore further the notion of power. The circulation of different types of agency reflects a 
circulation of power, as well institutional power and individual power. The amount of power 
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efficient power of agency in the process of institutional change. It is also consistent with the 
call  of  several  institutional  scholars  to  give  more  attention  to  power  to  account  for 
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Appendix 1: List of actions 
 
 
iD  Action  iD  Action 
1  Organisation of an international conference about 
Asbestos in London with European and Anglo-Saxon 
producers 
32  Adoption of protective measures to transport 
asbestos 
2  Creation of COFREBA  33  Law to ban flocking for all kinds of buildings 
3  Beginning of an industrial strife in Ferodo (French 
producer of asbestos)  
34  Organisation of conferences in Paris to promote 
asbestos  
4  Organisation by the WHO of an international 
conference in Lyon (France)  
35  Asbestos industrial unions change their name and 
become an association  
5  Publication by the INRS of documents to explain how 
to use asbestos without any risks  
36  Creation of the CPA 
6  Complaints of asbestos workers against Johns-
Manville (American asbestos producer) 
37  Organisation of asbestos removal work in schools 
7  Organisation by the ILO of an international conference 
in Genève. Publication by the ILO of a report 
"Asbestos : risks for health, how to to prevent them" 
38  Organisation of a worldwide symposium in 
Montreal 
8  Creation of a special committee in Eternit to control 
security and working environment  
39  Adoption of law to limit exposure 
9  Declaration by the CIRC that most of asbestos 
products are carcinogenic (still uncertainty about the 
main form of asbestos) 
40  Ban of all kinds of asbestos (but chrysotile) 
10  Beginning of an industrial strife in Amisol   41  New lowering of tolerated exposure 
11  Creation of a social movement in the University of 
Jussieu  
42  Complaints of professor's widows  
12  Meeting between Jussieu and Amisol   43  Organisation of a conference in Jussieu 
13  Call for solidarity for Amisol workers  44  Recognition by french scientists  
14  Beginning of new types of negociation in Amisol   45  Creation of the CAPER  
15  Publication by the INRS of documents to propose limit 
to exposition  
46  Winding-up of the CPA 
16  Adoption of a law (to protect workers under 18)   47  Publication of an french investigation  
17  Pulling down the limit of exposition   48  Broadcasting of a TV program against asbestos 
(prime time) 
18  Modification of the french recognition of asbestos 
industrial diseases 
49  Creation of the ANDEVA 
19  Publication of lot of booklets, advertisements by 
asbestos industrial unions  
50  Complaints of 5 sickmen 
20  Organisation by th CIRC of a conference about the 
asbestos risks  
51  Publication of an official report (INSERM) 
21  The asbestos producer unions write to the French 
Prime Minister 
52  New lowering of tolerated exposure and adoption  
22  Promotion through the media of the Amisol's scandal  53  Law to protect workers 
23  Consumer associations denounce the presence of 
asbestos in wine and in consumer goods 
54  Obligation for owner to diagnose asbestos in 
buildings 
24  Organisation by the asbestos producers unions of a 
conference to defend the use of asbestos  
55  Ban of all kinds of asbestos (Imports and use of 
asbestos) 
25  Broadcasting of 3 TV programs against asbestos      
26  Publication of a book by asbestos industrial unions      
27  Violent answer from a famous scientific that 
denounces asbestos practices 
   
28  All kind of asbestos are recognized as carcinogenic by 
the CIRC 
   
29  Publication by the "Collectif de Jussieu" of a pamphlet 
"Danger, Asbestos" 
   
30  Ban of flocking for lodging in France     
31  Adoption of a law to limit the exposure of workers     
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List of acronyms and actors 
 
Acronyms 
ACGIH : American Conference of Industrial Hygienists. Today, membership is open to all practitioners in 
industrial hygiene, occupational health, environmental health, and safety domestically and abroad. 
Chambre syndicale de l’amiante : Union of asbestos producers. It becomes the “association of asbestos”. The 
lobby of asbestos in France that controlled all the production and the use of asbestos in France. This union 
manages to impose and supervise the “controlled use of asbestos” in France.  
CIRC : Centre international de Recherche sur le Cancer (CIRC) is part of WHO (World Heath Organization). 
COFREBA : Comité français d'étude sur les effets biologiques de l'amiante (COFREBA), premier lobby de 
« l'or blanc » 
First lobby of the “white gold”, the COFREBA is a French committee in charge of biological studies to measure 
the effects of asbestos.  
CPA : Comité Permanent Amiante.  
French committee in charge of the control and the organization of the „controlled use of asbestos‟ in France. This 
committee is under the supervision of the French government but its funds come from industrials. Doctors, trade 
unionists, scientist, asbestos industrials belong to the committee. This structure is unique and is the emblem of 
the „controlled use of asbestos‟.  
INRS : Institut National de Recherche et de Sécurité. French national institute devoted to research and security 
about the questions of industrial diseases and work related accidents.  
 
Firms 
Amisol : Amisol is a French firm specialized in the production of textile. Amisol embodies the scandal of 
asbestos in  France in 70‟.  Amisol‟s  workers deads and diseases  were the proof of the dangers linked  to a 
professional exposure.  
Eternit : Eternit is the leader in the production of asbestos cement and building products. It is one of the main 
actor in the promotion of the „controlled use of asbestos‟. 
Ferodo : Ferodo is French firm specialised in the production of equipments for cars (car brakes, clutches etc..). 
Ferodo used to employing lost of asbestos in the production of their products. Ferodo is now well known as 
Valeo.  
Jussieu:  Jussieu  is  a  university  recently  built,  with  asbestos  flocking,  in  Paris  intra-muros  in  the  1960‟. 
Professors and researchers alarmed governments and gave a media coverage to Amisol‟s workers. What‟s more 
their implications changed the issue : asbestos risks are not only industrial risks. In the 80‟, the movement 
disappeared and reappeared in a different way in the 90‟ to promote the ban of asbestos and asbestos removal 
work. 
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